As communication costs fall, foreign embassies and consulates have lost much of their role in decision-making and information-gathering. Accordingly, foreign services are increasingly marketing themselves as agents of export promotion. I investigate whether exports are in fact systematically associated with diplomatic representation abroad. I use a recent cross-section of data covering twenty-two large exporters and two-hundred import destinations. Bilateral exports rise by approximately six to ten per cent for each additional consulate abroad, controlling for a host of other features including reverse causality. The effect varies by exporter, and is nonlinear; consulates have smaller effects than the creation of an embassy.
Introduction
What does the Foreign Service do? More generally, why do countries spend so many resources on embassies, consulates, and the Foreign Service?
In times gone by, embassies, consulates, and the like -hereafter "foreign missions" -were important sources of information and were empowered to make significant decisions. But as communication costs have fallen, much information about foreign countries has become quickly and cheaply available through alternate sources. Key decisions about foreign affairs are increasingly made at home and simply communicated abroad. Consular affairs -passports, visas, and the like -do not seem to justify the expense and prestige of a Foreign Service. In the age of the internet, is there a raison d'être for the Foreign Service?
One answer increasingly given is that the Foreign Service promotes exports.
Ambassadors, commercial attaches, and other members of the diplomatic corps are said to pay a key role in developing and maintaining export markets. This short paper asks the question: are foreign missions in fact systematically linked to exports? To be more concrete, consider the fact that in 2003, both Brazil and Belgium exported seventeen billion dollars of goods to the United States, despite the fact that Belgium's economy is over twice as big as Brazil's, and both are approximately the same distance from the United States. Brazil maintains seven consulates (and an embassy) in the United States, while Belgium only has four consulates (and an embassy). Is Brazil's larger network a material advantage to its exporters, and a reason why it maintains its export presence in the American market?
To answer this question, I link exports from twenty-two important countries to twohundred destination countries. I take advantage of the fact that countries have varying number of foreign missions abroad. Some embassies cover multiple countries, while some countries host an embassy and a number of consulates. For instance, in December 2004 the United States had an embassy and six consulates in Canada, an embassy in Cape Verde, and no official presence in the Central African Republic (it is covered from Chad and Cameroon). The Netherlands has over four-hundred foreign missions, while Sweden has less than a hundred. I use such differences to ask whether there is a measurable link between the size of the Foreign Service and exports.
I use annual data averaged over 2002-03, and control for other determinants of trade through a standard "gravity" model. I estimate my cross-section using least-squares, and show my results are robust to inclusion of different types of country-specific fixed effect intercepts. I also account for reverse causality; as instrumental variables I employ variables that are correlated with the importance of countries (e.g., proven oil reserves) and the desirability of living there as a Foreign Service officer (e.g., the number of Condé-Nast top 100 destinations in a country).
I find that the presence of foreign missions is indeed positively correlated with exports.
Holding other things constant, I find that each additional consulate is associated with slightly higher exports; my point estimate is around six to ten per cent. This result is statistically significant, and economically plausible in magnitude. It varies by exporter, and also seems to be non-linear; the first foreign mission has a larger effect on exports than successive missions. Still, the Foreign Service does indeed seem to promote exports at the margin.
Motivation
Foreign Services are expensive. For instance, the 2004 fiscal year budget request for the US Department of State included $4.2 billion for diplomatic and consular programs, and $1.5 billion for embassy security, construction and maintenance. • "Promoting peace and stability in regions of vital interest;
• Creating jobs at home by opening markets abroad;
• • "conduct all diplomatic and consular relations on behalf of Canada;
• conduct all official communication between the Government of Canada and the government of any other country and between the Government of Canada and any international organization; …
• foster the expansion of Canada's international trade; …" 7 This is also true of other large countries. For instance, the German Missions abroad "can be called Germany's eyes, ears and voice abroad. On instructions from the Federal Foreign Office, they represent our country, defend its interests and protect its citizens in the host country. They negotiate with the government of the host country and promote political relations as well as economic, cultural and scientific cooperation. The essential tasks of the missions include:
• collecting information,
• reporting on issues which are of relevance to the various authorities of the Federation and the Länder,
• helping German citizens in emergencies,
• assisting German companies with their activities in the host country and generally enhancing mutual trade, …" 8 been strategically located in the Regional Development Agencies to ensure they play a full role in drawing up regional trade strategies. The first point of contact for inquiries by companies in the UK is their International Trade Advisor, located at their local Business Link.
UK Trade & Investment services include:
• Your Passport to Export Success-UK Trade & Investment's flagship assessment and skills-based programme that provides new and inexperienced exporters with the training, planning and ongoing support they need to succeed overseas.
• Export Explorer, an integrated package of help and advice that enables small and medium size firms to experience new and accessible export markets at minimal cost… Teams of commercial officers at British Diplomatic posts overseas work to understand the local business environment and match opportunities to the capabilities of UK firms. Help for existing exporters takes a variety of forms aimed at meeting a wide range of customer needs. It ranges from the straightforward provision of information, through detailed advice in response to specific enquiries, to lobbying overseas on behalf of UK companies."
Similarly, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade describes their own objectives as:
"The department's aim is to advance the interests of Australia and Australians internationally. This aim is the driving force behind our work and underpins all the department's goals, priorities, values and culture.
The department's goals are to:
• enhance Australia's security
• contribute to growth in Australia's economy, employment and standard of living…"
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The relevant question is not whether Foreign Services believe they are in the business of export promotion (at least in part), but whether they are effective at it. I now investigate that issue. where i denotes the exporter, j denotes the importer, ln(.) denotes the natural logarithm operator, and the variables are defined as:
Methodology
• X ij denotes annual real exports from i to j in dollars, averaged between 2002 and 2003,
• EmbCon ij is the number of embassies, consulates, and official foreign missions that i has in j,
• D is the distance between i and j,
• Y is annual real GDP per capita in dollars, averaged between 2002 and 2003,
• Pop is average population,
• Lang is a binary "dummy" variable which is unity if i and j have a common language and zero otherwise, • Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border,
• Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2).
• Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2),
• Area is the area of the country (in square kilometers),
• Col is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t,
• CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t,
• FTA is a binary variable that is unity if i and j both belong to the same regional trade agreement, • β is a vector of nuisance coefficients, and
• ε ij represents the omitted other influences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well behaved.
The coefficient of interest to me is γ, which represents the marginal effect of an additional foreign mission on exports. Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix Table A3 . I also tabulate the simple correlation between the number of foreign missions and the other variables. The strongest correlation between the number of foreign missions and other regressors (in particular, the log of importer population) is only .39, indicating that multicollinearity is not likely to be a serious problem.
Results
My benchmark results are tabulated in Table 1 . This presents coefficients estimated in five different ways: a) OLS; b)-d) adding exporter fixed effects, importer fixed effects, and both; and e) using instrumental variables to account for reverse causality between exports and embassies/consulates. The default instrumental variables I use for the number of embassies/consulates in an importer include: a) the number of Zagat's guides in an importer; b) the number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations; c) the number of Lonely Planet guides; d) the number of Economist city guides/importer; and e) proven oil reserves.
The gravity model of exports that underlies the estimation works well in two senses.
First, the model fits the data well, explaining over three quarters of the variation in bilateral exports. Second, the coefficients are, on the whole, intuitive in sign and size, and both economically and statistically significant. For instance, countries export less to destinations that are further away; the elasticity is about -.75 and highly statistically significant. Richer and larger exporters and importers do more business, as do countries linked by regional trade agreements, a land border, or a common language. Landlocked and physically large countries do less trade;
colonies trade more with their colonizers. All this is conventional, reasonable, and bolsters confidence in the underlying framework.
Above and beyond these effects, there is still a role for the Foreign Service. In particular, each additional consulate placed abroad is associated with a rise of bilateral exports of between six and ten per cent. This estimate seems economically plausible, but is small compared to the effects of e.g., a common language, land border, or regional trade agreement. The effect differs only a little across estimation techniques. Least squares gives an estimate of about ten per cent with little variation depending on whether fixed effects are added or not. 18 Instrumental variables delivers a lower estimate, but one that is still statistically significant (the associated tstatistic is 3.1); I consider this in further detail below.
18 It is not possible to compute sensible Hausman tests and compare the least-squares estimates; the chi-squared test statistics are negative. This is because the variance matrices do not satisfy the (asymptotic) 'overlap" conditions in the sample. However, the coefficient of interest, γ, is economically and statistically similar when least squares is used for all sets of fixed effects (none/exporter/importer/both). exercise of dropping all industrial countries. The effect remains positive and statistically significant throughout, though it is typically modest in size.
Although the point estimates for OLS and IV were similar in Table 1 , the issue of reverse causality is potentially serious and deserves further attention. In Table 3 , I provide eight different sets of instrumental variable estimates. First, I reproduce the IV estimate of γ tabulated in Table 1 . I then add exporter-specific fixed effect intercepts, the importer analogues, and then both together. In the lower half of the The results in Tables 1-3 pool all the data across both exporters and destination countries.
However, they may disguise cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of foreign missions on exports. Table 4 takes account of country-specific coefficients in three different ways. At the left is a set of estimate of γ -the effect of foreign missions on exports -when I estimate the equation country by country. Most of the effects are positive, and they differ dramatically across countries. Still, the coefficient is usually estimated without precision. Accordingly, in the middle column I pool the data again, but allow for country-specific slopes. Thus, the nuisance coefficients are constrained to be common across countries, but each country is allowed its own slope for the effect of foreign missions on trade (country-specific γ's). There is still evidence of substantial heterogeneity (and indeed the hypothesis of a common γ slope is rejected by the data), though estimation precision remains typically poor. This is also true of the last column on the right, which pools nuisance coefficients across countries (as with the middle column), but adds Netherlands; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland; Canada; Japan; Finland; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Malta; Portugal; Spain; Turkey; Australia; New Zealand; and South Africa. 20 Again, Hausman tests are not possible because of small-sample issues. However, it is clear that adding importer fixed effects makes for an enormous difference in the coefficient of interest, when IV is used as an estimator. 21 In Appendix Table A4 I present the estimates of the first stage estimation (without fixed effects). These show that the most successful plausibly exogenous determinants of the number of foreign missions are: a) the number of top-100 Condé-Nast destinations in a country; b) the number of Economist city-guides; c) proven oil reserves; d) military spending; and e) the presence of a monsoonal climate. 22 This is especially appropriate since my equation is over-identified but does not pass a standard Sargan test of the over-identifying restrictions.
exporter-and importer-specific intercepts. The effect of foreign missions on trade seems to vary considerably across exporters.
In Table 5 I investigate whether the first foreign mission in a country -almost always the embassy -has a different effect on exports from additional missions. 23 I test for a non-linear effect of foreign missions on exports in two different ways. First, I include in the equation a binary dummy variable for the first foreign mission in a country (denoted "Embassy"), as well as a separate variable for the number of missions after the first, if any (denoted "Consulates"). I estimate this equation with pooled OLS, and then successively add exporter-fixed effects, importer intercepts, and both together. Then I re-estimate the equations in the same four ways, adding the square of the number of foreign missions after the first ("Square of Consulates").
The results show strong evidence of a non-linear effect of the number of foreign missions on exports. The establishment of a first foreign mission is associated with a substantial effect on trade. While the exact estimate of γ varies somewhat depending on which econometric specification is preferred, the creation of an embassy is associated with at least an increase in exports of [exp(.79)-1≈] 120 per cent. Some of this is undoubtedly the result of reverse causality, but the size of the effect is striking. 24 Additional consulates, by way of comparison, have a much smaller export effect, on the order of five to eleven per cent. Even this effect seems to fall as consulates are added, as shown by the fact that the square of the number of consulates is significantly negative. Succinctly, the effect of the first foreign mission on exports is large, but the effect from additional consulates seems to diminish rapidly.
Conclusion
In this short paper, I ask a simple question: is the presence of foreign missions systematically linked to a country's exports? Using a bilateral gravity model of trade, the answer is positive; holding other factors constant, exports seems to rise between six and ten per cent for each additional consulate.
I find evidence that the creation of the embassy has a substantially larger impact on exports than additional consulates. This non-linearity, along with the cross-country heterogeneity, and reverse causality I have found are all technical issues that merit further research. There is also an interesting economic issue that I have not attempted to address.
Embassies, consulates and the like purport to do a host of functions; this paper has considered only one. Are the benefits of any trade creation sufficient to justify any reasonable fraction of the costs of the Foreign Service? I leave such question for others to address in future research. Coefficient tabulated is effect of number of embassies/consulates on log of average real exports. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS; included but unrecorded controls include: log distance, log importer GDP p/c and population; RTA dummy; currency union dummy; log product land area; common language dummy; land border dummy; number islands; colony dummy; constant. Coefficient tabulated is effect of number of embassies/consulates on log of average real exports.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Included but unrecorded controls include: log distance, log importer GDP p/c and population; RTA dummy; currency union dummy; log product land area; common language dummy; land border dummy; number islands; colony dummy; constant.
Default instrumental variables for number of embassies/consulates include: a) number of Zagat's guides/importer; b) number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations/importer; c) number of Lonely Planet guides/importer; d) number of Economist city guides/importer; and e) proven oil reserves/importer. Larger IV set also includes: a) number of Baedeker guides/destination; b) number of Michelin guides/destination; c) Military spending of the destination country; d) proven gas reserves/importer; and e) Monsoonal dummy. Coefficient tabulated is effect of number of embassies/consulates on log of average real exports. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS; included but unrecorded controls include: log distance, log importer GDP p/c and population; RTA dummy; currency union dummy; log product land area; common language dummy; land border dummy; number islands; colony dummy; constant. Coefficient tabulated is effect of embassies/consulates on log of average real exports. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS; included but unrecorded controls include: log distance, log importer GDP p/c and population; RTA dummy; currency union dummy; log product land area; common language dummy; land border dummy; number islands; colony dummy; constant. Proven Oil Reserves (bbl)
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Proven Natural Gas Reserves (cu m) Regressand is number of embassies/consulates. 4,123 observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS; included but unrecorded controls include: log distance, log importer GDP p/c and population; RTA dummy; currency union dummy; log product land area; common language dummy; land border dummy; number islands; colony dummy; constant.
Average is mean per destination country from cross-section of 200 countries.
